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The ethical and legal framework governing animal experi-
mentation in Australia has changed little since 1990 despite the 
publication of new editions of the Code of Practice. The latest 
Code was published in 2012, again with minimal change. The 
problems which I outline apply to all editions of the Code from 
1990 to the present. Allen and Halligan pick up on the frame-
work for the 2004 Code suggesting that my criticisms relate to 
the period before 2004. My acquaintance with the workings 
of Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) and the various codes 
spans a long period pre-dating 2004 and extending to the pres-
ent. I chose to direct my article to the 2004 Code given that it 
was current at the time of writing. I note that Allen and Hal-
ligan do likewise. There are in fact no changes affecting our 
points of disagreement in the 2012 edition. 
I argued in my article that there has been uneven compliance 
with the appointment of independent community members to 
the Animal Ethics Committees. It is heartening to see that the 
University of Sydney does comply. My own university only re-
cently changed its practice. Until 2011 the category D position 
was filled by a philosopher employed by the University. I do not 
share the optimism expressed by Allen and Halligan that if one 
third of the committee is made of up of either animal welfare 
or community members not involved in animal research then 
this “ensures that community values have the opportunity to 
emerge.” These members may well feel intimated to question 
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the views of the two-thirds of the members on the committee 
who are committed to animal experimentation either through 
their scientific research or the handling of animals. 
Referring to the principles of Reduction, Refinement and 
Replacement in my article, I note that “It is the latter that has 
proved most problematic.” Hence the focus of the rest of the ar-
ticle. Allen and Halligan claim that there is robust discussion of 
ethical issues in their committee and cite as examples: “the ap-
propriate housing for particular animal species and the extent to 
which a given procedure will affect the welfare of an animal.” 
These are issues which fall under the principle of Refinement. 
There is however no indication that there is discussion about 
Replacement. 
One of the key reasons why ethics committees don’t work is 
that the people on the committees whether they are scientists or 
not would generally fail to have a grasp of the possible alterna-
tives to using animals in order to work out whether the pro-
posal under consideration is justified. According to the Code 
the scientists on the Committee must be experienced in the use 
of animals for scientific purposes. Hence it is unlikely that their 
training would have taken them into “replacement” fields such 
as computer simulation or human epidemiology. The commu-
nity members will then be relying on the scientists to tell them 
whether alternatives are available but the scientists are unlikely 
to be well enough informed i.e., have expertise across all viable 
alternatives, to be able to provide a basis for the discussion. So 
I criticized the Animal Ethics Committees for not adequately 
taking into account the Replacement principle when working 
out whether animal based research is justified. I did not intend 
to criticize individual members of the Committees as there are 
structural reasons for this weakness. It’s not the fault of the 
Denise Russell
8
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
individual committee members that the committee has been set 
up in such a way that the crucial ethical question for an Animal 
Ethics Committee, viz., “Is this research justified?”, is unlikely 
be adequately addressed.
The AEC cannot rely on the researcher putting in the pro-
posal to provide guidance into consideration of alternatives as 
if they are motivated to pursue animal-based research they are 
likely to have little or no acquaintance with alternatives such 
as human epidemiology or computer simulation which require 
in-depth study in different faculties. Again this is not meant as a 
personal criticism. I am simply trying to point out that what the 
researcher is required to do in terms of looking at alternatives 
and working out that none are available is too much to demand. 
The researchers may put on the forms that they have consid-
ered alternatives but given that they won’t have an academic 
background in all viable ones then their consideration has to be 
superficial. 
Allen and Halligan state that many different alternatives are 
used by the scientific community and “researchers are free to 
use the methodologies that they believe are best suited for solv-
ing the problem that interests them.” This is not always true. 
They may need to work in a team and there may be no team 
in their institution using methodologies that they believe to be 
best. This is particularly the case in small institutions. Also it 
may be difficult to get funding for non-animal based research 
in fields such as biology. The fact that the University of Sydney 
offers an annual prize for the best alternative to animal experi-
mentation on the one hand tells us that this institution is valuing 
research in alternatives but on the other, that it is not by any 
means the norm. In any case, the issue is whether the research-
ers will have the background in different alternatives to kno 
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whether it is necessary to use animals or not and whether the 
AECs will have the expertise to assess that. 
I wonder on what basis Allen and Halligan claim that “most 
scientists believe that for many of the most complex biological 
issues, particularly those concerned with diseases, animal mod-
els are required to make progress.” Which scientists have they 
consulted? Those doing conventional biology? Those working 
in in vitro studies? Those working in genomics at MIT? It’s a 
completely general claim and of a type that is used to close an 
argument. Andrew Knight’s book, The Costs and Benefits of 
Animal Experimentation, looks at the systematic reviews pub-
lished in peer-reviewed scientific journals which he claims: 
have demonstrated that animals are insufficiently pre-
dictive of human outcomes to provide substantial ben-
efits during the development of human clinical inter-
ventions or the assessment of human toxicity. In only 
2 of 20 such reviews located during a comprehensive 
survey did the authors conclude that animal models 
were either significantly useful in contributing to the 
development of clinical interventions or substantially 
consistent with clinical outcomes. Furthermore, one of 
these conclusions was contentious (Knight 20l1, 183). 
The scientists’ belief that Allen and Halligan refer to looks like 
it could be founded on inadequate investigation. 
In a major study reported this year in the Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences Soek et al. (2013) found 
that mice models for human sepsis, burns and trauma fail. The 
reason why they fail has been worked out by studies over ten 
years involving thirty nine researchers using human tissue and 
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genomics.  Dr Fink, a sepsis expert at the University of Cali-
fornia said that “When I read the paper I was stunned at just 
how bad the mouse data are …[yet] until now to get funding 
you had to propose experiments using the mouse model…This 
is a game changer” (Jaslow 2013). It is not just that the mouse 
has been shown to be a very poor model of the human but the 
reason why this is the case has been exposed. Billions of lives 
have been lost in useless research. Billions of dollars have been 
wasted. If alternatives to using animals had been explored ear-
lier what a saving this would have been. The question, why is 
the mouse model failing could possibly have been triggered by 
taking up on the fact that mice can eat rotten food and not get 
sick but humans often do get sick by eating such food. Year 
after year research has been conducted in the hope of finding 
cures for sepsis, burns and trauma from animal studies when 
we now know that drugs that work for mice for these condi-
tions will be ineffectual in humans and possibly deadly.  The 
study of alternatives to using animals was needed to get to this 
point. It is interesting just how good an example of Thomas 
Kuhn’s ideas this illustration is. He argued that it is hard to see 
the weakness in a paradigm (understood as a way of doing sci-
ence at a particular time) until alternatives are developed (Kuhn 
1970, 111-117). 
Allen and Halligan give examples of the role of AECs in 
over-seeing animal welfare when animal experiments take 
place. I am happy to believe that this is true. They claim that 
“AECs  frequently modify applications with the aim of replac-
ing, reducing or refining animal usage.” I can understand how 
modifying applications could lead to reducing and refining ani-
mal usage. I don’t understand how modifying applications can 
lead to replacing animal usage. It doesn’t make sense. If the 
AEC decides that animals should not be used then the applica-
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tion should be rejected, not modified. I think this illustrates the 
mind-set that ethical issues relate to animal welfare in experi-
ments rather than the deeper, more important question, should 
animals be used at all?
Many, perhaps most, in the community might accept animal 
experimentation for scientific advance as Allen and Halligan 
claim. However are they right in doing so? If the systematic 
surveys of the results reported by Andrew Knight are correct 
then the assumption about the human utility of animal models 
is untested and unfounded (Knight 2011, 4). So the fact that 
these community attitudes exist, if they do, can’t be used to 
justify using animals in research. Many people in western com-
munities are aware that there is scrutiny of animal research. 
Some know about the existence of AECs. I would conjecture 
that there is a common belief that there is enough oversight of 
animal experimentation to ensure that only justified research is 
let through. That is a false belief. 
In the face of the criticisms by Allen and Halligan I am not 
inclined to withdraw my claim that animal ethics committees 
don’t work. I grant that they may help with refinement of con-
ditions in experiments and reduction in the number of animals 
used and these are definite benefits for animals. However they 
don’t and can’t work to ensure that only justified research is 
allowed through. The Committees presence gives the wider 
community a reassurance that ethical questions have been ad-
equately addressed. It’s a false reassurance but different modes 
of scrutiny are blocked because of the perception of adequate 
over-sight.   
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